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Nowadays, a process can be observed in Germany where electricity producing and 
trading firms react to the electricity market liberalisation by merging market shares, 
since the year 2000, which reduces the number of suppliers and influences production 
and consumer prices. This paper discusses whether the liberalisation process will have 
positive or negative impacts on the environmental situation and whether this process 
together with a phase out of nuclear power can guarantee the intended improvement of 
environmental conditions without governmental regulation in Germany. This is done by 
modelling different strategic options of energy suppliers and their impacts on the 
economic and environmental situation in the liberalised German electricity market by a 
computational game theoretic model. Calculations with this model show that when 
German firms act strategically (e.g. a change in action of one firm affects the electricity 
price and, hence, the payoffs of other firms), the environment is better off at the cost of 
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1. Introduction 
The liberalisation process of the European electricity market initiated in 1996 leads to 
fundamental and extensive changes within the energy sector. Previous natural monopo-
lies face national and international competition, which is expected to induce a permanent 
improvement of production, distribution and marketing activities. Presently, expansive 
price competition can be observed as a result of the changing market situation.  
The liberalisation of the German electricity market opened new opportunities for house-
holds and industry to choose their energy supplier. By implementing the EU Directive 
96/92/EC on the internal market of electricity in December 1998, territorial monopolies 
were cancelled in German electricity production, resulting in a new structure of energy 
supply. Internal and external competition in production and transmission, forces energy 
suppliers towards new production behaviour. In order to provide a sufficient and long-
term cost-effective energy supply by the previous “natural monopolies”, a guideline was 
implemented for an undistorted competition in the German electricity market. 
Yet, competition is not guaranteed. While the old situation was characterised by regu-
lated, often state-owned monopolies, the current situation is that the electricity market is 
dominated by a small number of privatised giants. A first question this paper seeks to an-
swer is whether consumers are better off in the new situation, or whether the electricity 
companies are able to reap substantial oligopoly rents. A second, related question is how 
far the oligopoly is removed from perfect competition. A third question relates to the en-
vironmental implications of the electricity market liberalisation. 
Experiences in England and Scandinavia demonstrated several structural and economic 
development changes, inducing employment reactions and industrial and private energy 
price variations. In light of opportunities created by the planned opening of the European 
electricity market, firms tend to act strategically like global market players, by merging 
market shares and joining gains. Day and Bunn (1999) investigated these aspects by a 
game theoretic model of market power and strategic actions of firms in the UK. Bower 
and Bunn (1999) assess trade opportunities within a pool versus a bilateral trade system 
in the electricity market of the UK. Admundsen and Bergman (2002) studied these issues 
for the Norwegian and Swedish power market. Here, transmission and transport pricing 
plays a crucial role. Experiences in Scandinavia and England suggest that a uniform tar-
iff is preferred over distance charges. Moreover, market opportunities and grid owners 
significantly influence trade. Dawson and Shuttleworth (1997) studied transmission pric-
ing in Norway and Sweden. Green (1997) examined this effect for the UK. Cardell et al 
(1994) investigated the negative effects of market power and transmission constraints on 
trading by an imperfect competition model for North American electricity suppliers. 
Different non-cooperative games within various markets have been examined by diverse 
authors. Murphy, Sherali et al. (1986) demonstrate mathematical programming ap-
proaches in order to determine oligopolitic market equilibria. Salant and Shaffer (1999) 
illustrate the theoretical impacts on production and social welfare by two stage Cournot-
Nash equilibrium solutions by including investments due to learning by doing and R&D 
determining marginal costs of identical agents differently. For Europe, Jing- Yuan and 
Smeers (1999) modelled an oligopolistic electricity market within a Nash equilibrium by      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  4 
a sophisticated game theoretic model. More generally, Helman et al. (1999) investigated 
different kind of trade options and strategic price setting within the electricity market. 
Stern (1998) investigates the liberalisation of the European gas market. 
In a liberalised electricity market, electricity suppliers can act strategically, which influ-
ences electricity prices, due to changing market shares. Furthermore, it can become at-
tractive to merge with other firms, as it increases the electricity price. While enhancing 
competition in the electricity market, strategic behaviour (e.g. a change in action of one 
firm affects the electricity price and, hence, the payoffs of other firms) determines the 
structure of the market and energy supply network (see also Kemfert (1999) and Kemfert 
and Tol (2000)). 
In this paper, strategic behaviour of energy suppliers and their impacts on the economic 
and environmental situation in the liberalised German electricity market is studied with 
the game theoretic modelling tool EMELIE (Electricity MarkEt Liberalisation In 
Europe). EMELIE is calibrated in Section 5 to the main German energy suppliers, which 
are linked by capital flows. These firms produce electricity by different technologies, 
considering others’ and their own capacities, operational and marginal costs (including 
sunk costs). Within this context, the analysis focuses on the impacts of strategic action 
by firms, which is compared with the case without strategic action where firms are fully 
competitive. We investigate the electricity prices and the environmental effectiveness of 
applied technologies. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes Germany’s electricity market 
structure. Section 3 introduces the computational game theoretic model EMELIE, while 
Section 4 formalises this. EMELIE is calibrated to the German liberalised electricity 
market in Section 5. Section 6 presents the main model results and a sensitivity analysis 
on crucial model assumptions. The final section concludes.  
 
2. Germany’s electricity market structure 
In a liberalised electricity market, strategic behaviour may determine the market struc-
ture of energy suppliers and the composition of technologies employed. Energy suppliers 
can choose among various strategies, e.g. optimise their production, maximising their 
market shares, increasing electricity prices, and lowering demand or consumption sur-
plus.
1 New energy products, such as energy services, and new market actors, such as 
electricity brokers through exchange firms are to be established in a liberalised market.  
In order to achieve product differentiation and to obtain a competitive advantage, 
“brand” electricity has been designed, which is a recent trend in the German electricity 
market. One example is the nation-wide marketing of “green” electricity generated by 
hydroelectric power plants by BAYERNWERK and RWE (see Table 1 for an overview 
of 30 German utilities), which has already been feeding the national grid to the same ex-
tent as before liberalisation. Due to the liberalisation of the electricity market, the cus-
                                                   
1   See Wietschel et al (2001). A discussion of recent developments of the German electricity 
market is given by Pfaffenberger and Haupt (2001)      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  5 
tomer’s growing environmental awareness becomes an attractive target for the energy 
suppliers’ marketing activities. In spite of this growing environmental awareness, the 
share of electricity generated from renewables is only marginal compared to the overall 
power generation. In 1998, the share of renewable energy in the total electricity produc-
tion was only 5.2 % (25.3 TWh), of which 68.3 % (17.3 TWh) was produced by hydroe-
lectric power.  
The low share of renewable energy including high production and consumer prices indi-
cates that the consumer does not use this as an important parameter in choosing an en-
ergy supplier. Their choice, so far, is fairly independent of the kind of technology that is 
used for electricity generation. Fossil fuels like hard coal (27 %), lignite (25 %), and gas  
(9 %) represent with approximately 60 % the largest share of Germany's fuel mix. The 
resulting CO2 emissions do not play any role in the customer's choice (despite the eco-
logical tax reform), as they do not directly find their way into the electricity price. Nu-
clear power generation represents with approximately 30 % the largest single production 
share, which has a positive effect on the overall CO2 balance of electricity generation, 
but this has to be faced out due to other environmental objections. 
Advertisement of the main utilities has been changed, because consumers are not very 
flexible in changing utilities, the main electricity supplier decided to enlarge the supply 
by further product differentiation. However, since 2001 they have already reduced these 
initiatives. The recent developments of the German electricity market are summarised in 
Strombasiswissen (2002).  
After the electricity market liberalisation in 1998-2000, the capital shares and owner-
ships have been changed. First all firms per previous supply region merged into one. 
Second, BAYERNWERK and PREUSSENELEKTRA are acquired by E.ON, the East-
ern part Germany including Hamburg by VATTENFALL, RWE acquired VEW, while 
EnBW did not change owner. Due to these changes, the operating costs of the old firms 
probably did not change so much, but the capital shares did.  
The first result of the liberalised power market is a decrease of the energy price, as an 
outcome of fierce price competition for increasing market shares by binding clients. 
Here, the electricity prices are mainly determined by strategic behaviour of energy sup-
pliers, leading to firm mergers, production costs, capital intensities, the extent of overca-
pacities, and price elasticities of demand. These kind of issues are integrated in EMELIE 
(Electricity MarkEt Liberalisation In Europe). Furthermore, the new renewable energy 
law (EEG) and the eco tax, lead to a substantial increase in the electricity price (Osch-
mann 2000). Because of vertical and horizontal production cooperation and mergers, 
market shares increase, which increases the electricity price in the long run. Within an 
oligopolistic electricity market, not only price competition plays an important role, but 
also additional services offered by energy suppliers for binding costumers and gaining 
market shares.  
A conjoint analysis by McKinsey (2001) shows that only 20 to 30 % of all customers are 
very price sensitive, i.e. they choose their demand only because of price differences. For 
all other customers, supply reliability, tradition and additional services are more essen-
tial, which explains that only 0.5 % of all customers changed their energy supplier 
(Drake et al, 2000). But, the competition for customer loyalty and market shares has led 
to a drastic decline in the electricity price, because energy suppliers are trying to enhance      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  6 
their established clientele and, hence, their market share through their price setting poli-
cies. EMELIE compares different reactions of the market, due to price variations. 
Price competition in the electricity market forces a development of cheap technologies 
for electricity production and a reduction of overcapacities, due to the resulting price 
drop. Energy suppliers act as strategic planners, which leads to mergers by large firms, 
as the real firm coalitions of VEAG, BAYERNWERK, VEW, EBW and EdF (Energy de 
France is the main utility in France using nuclear energy) demonstrate. Market concen-
tration would increase consumer prices. Actual market developments show that energy 
prices indeed increase, but this is also caused by the German eco tax, the renewable en-
ergy law and increasing world energy market prices. The electricity market prices deter-
mine to a large extent firm’s profits and, therefore, the technologies used for electricity 
production by individual firms. Environmental efficient technologies are more likely to 
be used, as electricity prices increase, firm’s market shares extend, the new renewable 
energy law (EEG) is implemented and an eco tax is introduced. For Germany, Prognos 
and EWI (Prognos 2000) predict a decrease of CO2 emissions by 10.5 % within a time 
period from 1997 to 2020, caused by an increase of power generation by gas and renew-
able energy, in order to substitute more environmentally harmful coal and nuclear en-
ergy. 
 
3. The Game theoretic Modelling approach 
We investigate these market developments by a game theoretic model EMELIE (Elec-
tricity MarkEt Liberalisation In Europe). EMELIE can be characterised as a computa-
tional model, with which strategic and oligopolistic market behaviour by firms within a 
liberalised market can be investigated. Each individual energy supplier acts as a market 
player and observes a quantity strategy within a non-cooperative oligopolistic game. 
EMELIE includes energy suppliers, producing electricity by different technologies, by 
considering power plants and their individual capacities, operational and marginal costs 
(including sunk costs) and their environmental responsiveness. Each player maximises 
her individual profit assuming that all other players apply a gain maximisation strategy. 
Profits follow from marginal production costs, variable production costs, maximum net 
power, net access costs and transport costs and price dependent demand. Electricity pro-
duced by one competitive player influences the sales and trade volumes of others pro-
ducers. Each electricity producer considers oligopolistic interrelations, operating conjec-
turally in a Nash-equilibrium.  
A Cournot-Nash game is characterised by mutual, strategic reactions by individual mar-
ket players. This leads to a Nash equilibrium where all strategies of market actors are op-
timised as best responses to actions of all other market agents. That means, in an oligop-
oly, market shares can influence prices. Diverse energy suppliers (market players) are 
distinguished, corresponding to their previous monopoly territories, classified into a 
north and south component. In contrast to the oligopolistic market situation, in a fully 
competitive market, actors behave like price takers, equalising market prices to marginal 
production costs. Beside input parameter of electricity production, price elasticities of 
demand, transportation and net utilisation costs and transmission grid capacity are speci-     Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  7 
fied exogenously. EMELIE determines regional electricity prices, marginal electricity 
production costs, produced and traded electricity per technology per firm.  
3.1 MCP Formulation 
In solving optimality problems, it is important to recognise that each optimality problem 
can be defined and decoded as a complementarity problem reflecting all side constraints. 
Generally speaking, in the framework of a complementarity format, either a non-
negative variable is zero or the corresponding inequality constraint is, in fact, an equal-
ity. Primarily, by solving a mixed complementarity problem (MCP), the Karush Kuhn 
Tucker optimality conditions are determined and solved for a decision variable. The 
MCP format and the Karush Kuhn Tucker conditions are equivalent. So, each MCP 
problem can be transformed into the classical optimality conditions by consideration of 
side constraints and vice versa. The idea behind the MCP formulation is to develop a 
program that permits the classical decomposition method to be obsolete, instead ascer-
taining the MCP conditions directly. The main advantages of MCP are (1) the simulta-
neous and parallel determination of decision variables and side constraints and (2) the 
solution of complex mathematical programmes without an explicit formulation of the ob-
jective function. Specially developed solvers detect the MCP format directly and point 
out, if necessary, whether side constraints are incorrectly defined. Present-day computer 
technology allows an uncomplicated and fast solution of the MCP problems by mathe-
matical solving algorithms. GAMS provides, at this moment, MILES and PATH as ma-
jor solvers.
2 Additionally, applying the MCP method avoids the intricacy of finding a so-
lution by a standard NLP solver if the starting values are distant from the optimal values. 
Transforming an optimality problem into a MCP formulation requires a specification of 
the first order conditions and all upper and lower bounds of the decision variables. 
The MCP format allows an uncomplicated characterisation of simultaneously solved de-
cision variables (such as in game theory) and a fast solution procedure. GAMS provides 
this highly efficient formulation mainly in order to solve reciprocal modelling ap-




4. The model 
The computational game theoretic model EMELIE is characterised by following indices, 
parameters and variables: 
 
                                                   
2 The PATH solver is described in Ferris and Sinaoiromsaran (1998), MILES in Rutherford 
(1993). 
3 For a more complete overview of MCP problems and their application, see Ferris and Pang 
(1995).      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  8 
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  qi,f 
 
 
- Firms f ∈ F 
- Regions r ∈ R 
- Technologies i ∈ I 
 
 
- Transport cost (including taxes) from region r to region r*  
- Variable production costs for technology i 
- Reference demand for electricity in region r 
- Reference price for electricity in region r 
- Regional price elasticities of electricity demand 
- Net capacity of transport between region r and region r* 
- Maximum production capacity with technology i in firm f 
 
 
- Demand price for electricity in region r 
- Marginal and average costs of electricity production of firm f 
- Shadow price of electricity transport from region r to region r* 
- Market share of firm f in region r 
- Supply of electricity by firm f to region r 
- Production of electricity by firm f with technology i 
 
EMELIE is a partial equilibrium model of a liberalised electricity market with multiple 
actors and is inspired by the theory of industrial organisation (Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1992; Tirole, 1988). On the supply side, electricity producing firms maximise their prof-
its. On the regional electricity demand side consumers maximise utility. In equilibrium, 
prices pr clear regional markets. Electricity is transported and traded from region l(f) to 
region r and l(f) ≠ r. Moreover, firm f is matched to a region by function l(.):F Æ R, 
hence: ∀ f ∈ F: l(f) ∈ R. 
Let us first consider the (most difficult) case with strategic interaction among firms at 
the supply side. In this case, electricity producing firms f maximise their net profits. 
They do this by choosing their strategies as represented by their regional supplies sf,r si-
multaneously by assuming that other firm do the same. This is equivalent to maximising 
the profit firm f can obtain by supplying to region r. This profit is the difference between 
income from supplied electricity minus the cost of production and delivery, where the 
dependence of the demand function pr(.) on S constitutes “strategic action”. 







fr r fr f fr fr lf r
fr fF rR
Sp S s c s c s
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∈∈
Π = ⋅− ⋅− ⋅
=∑∑
Delivery is restricted by a maximum allowable transport capacity (trade constraint) be-
tween the region l(f)=r to delivery region r*. Net exports of region r to region r* with 
r≠r* is established by taking the difference between the export from region r to region r* 
and the import into region r* from region r. 
  ∀ r,r* ∈ R, where r≠r*      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  9 
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Note that the shadow price τr,r* measures the utilisation of the electricity net between re-
gion r and region r*. The value is zero if the transport constraint ηr,r* is not binding; oth-
erwise a loss is incurred by a foregone trade possibility, where shadow price τr1,r2 indi-
cates the value of this loss. Then it would make sense for the net owner to make invest-
ments for increasing the net capacity between region r1 and r2. The strict inequality 
holds when the shadow price τr,r* = 0, a result which is well-known from the Karush 
Kuhn Tucker conditions and is a typical characteristic of a mixed complementarity prob-
lem (MCP). 
The first order conditions for optimality of strategically acting firms follow from the fol-
lowing Lagrangian: 
       (3)  () () ()
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After taking the partial derivatives with respect to sf,r and after rearranging terms, we 
have: 
  ∀ r ∈ R and ∀ f ∈ F 
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Where the individual market shares in (2) are conveniently determined by: 















         (5) 
Furthermore, for deriving Equation (4), we need a price dependent electricity demand in 







r ⋅ − = σ          (6) 
Equation (4) is the classical “marginal cost equal to marginal income”. The marginal in-
come in the case of strategic action is reduced by the factor “market share” divided by 
price elasticity of demand. The market share can also be interpreted as a “monopoly” 
mark-up.  
The partial derivatives of L with respect to τl(f),r reproduces equation (2).  
Power supply by firm f to region r can be generated with various technologies i, like nu-
clear, hard coal, brown coal, oil, gas and hydro. We assume here a 3% electricity trans-
port loss.      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  10 
  ∀ f ∈ F 
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When we substitute (7) into (5), we obtain: 
         (8)  ∑ ∑
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× × = =
I i
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This means that the supply by firm f to region r is equal to the total production within 
firm f multiplied with its market share in region r accounting for a loss of 3% in trans-
port. In this way we have linked the actual decision variables in a firm (ϑ ) to 
the model. 
f i r f q , ,   and  
However, the market needs to be closed on the (consumer) demand side as well. This is 
achieved by setting up a regional consumer constant elasticity of return (CES) utility 
function, which consists of the consumer utility of supplied electricity minus the total 






































     (9) 
The related first order conditions are derived directly by taking the partial derivative with 
respect to regional demand sr, which leads to the well-known regional inverse demand 
function: 



















,         (10) 
Model (2), (4), (5), (7) and (10) is completed by putting restrictions on the variables, as 
shown in equations (11–18). A lower bound of marginal costs is determined by 
  ∀ i ∈ I and ∀ f ∈ F, where i is an available technology at firm f  





The maximum net production of each individual technology i bounds production of elec-
tricity by firm f:  
  ∀ i ∈ I and ∀ f ∈ F 
            (12) 
max
, , f i f i q q ≤
Non-negativity constraints result in: 
  pr, τl(f),r, ϑf,r, sf,r, qi,f ≥  0       (13–18) 
while the non-negativity of c
m
f is already guaranteed by (11).      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  11 
Model (2), (4), (5), (7) and (10–18) is used to calculate the Nash equilibrium in the case 
with strategic action, where market information is typically incomplete and we are deal-
ing with the case of imperfect markets. This case shall be referred to as “STRA”.  
A model with perfect markets is established by replacing equation (4) by: 
  ∀ r ∈ R and ∀ f ∈ F 




 with  τ  if l(f) = r   () () 0
t
, , = = r f l r f l c
Furthermore, equation (5) should be eliminated as well from the model, as in the case of 
equation (4’), market share ϑ  is no longer a variable. Of course, the market shares 
now follow exogenously from the model. Model (2), (4’), (7) and (10–18) is used to cal-
culate the competitive equilibrium in the case without strategic action. This case is de-
rived by reducing the demand function to an identity: pr(.)=pr. Here firms take market 
prices as given and we are dealing with the case of perfect markets. This case shall be re-
ferred at as “COMP”. 
r f ,
These model relations are written by the programming language GAMS, which decom-
poses the non-linear program as a mixed complementary problem (MCP). This is solved 
by the non-linear MCP-solving algorithm MILES, which is a mixed inequality and non-
linear equation solver. Partially, MILES approximates linear sub-problems by Lemke’s 
algorithm and solves the non-linear program by the generalised Newton algorithm itera-
tively with a backtracking line search. An optimal solution is found by maximising re-
gional profit conditions reciprocally under all considered constraints. 
Main outcomes are regional prices, interregional trade flows and the optimal market 
shares of each electricity producer from which the regional concentration of the industry 
can be calculated in terms of the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI). HHI is a measure 
for (regional) competitiveness (see also Tirole, 1988, pages 221–223): 








* , HHI ϑ






















         (20) 
 
5. Calibration of EMELIE to the German market 
In order to calibrate the model as formulated in the previous section to the case of Ger-
many, we need a wide range of information about the structure of the electricity market, 
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•  An inventory is needed of power generating firms (f) plants and their geographical 
location (r), by dividing the country into regions. For that purpose, we have divided 
Germany into 8 regions (Figure 1) and we included 30 power generating firms into 
the model (Table 2). However, the model and the model results are based on the 
German electricity market development until 31-12-1999. In the year 2000, 8 firms 
remained, where the firms in bold in Table 1 acquired the other firms in the region. 
This probably did not change the operating costs of the old firms, but it did change 
the capital shares. 
•  An inventory is needed of the available technologies. Technology opportunities in 
Germany. We considered nuclear technology (NUC), hard coal (HC), brown coal 
(BC), water (HYDRO), gas (GAS) and oil (OIL).  
•  The (regional) price elasticity of electricity demand is needed (see Table 2). 
•  The network access and transport costs between region r and region r* needs to be 
derived. This is calculated for the case of Germany with the following formula (see 




 (21)  () () ()
t1 0 0 1 k m n e t
,* ,* 1 0 0 ;  w i t h   ,* 1 0 0  i f   * rr cc c r r c r r r r =+⋅ ∆ − + ∆ = =
•  Here    represents the distances between region r and region r*. These are 
given in Table 3. 
( * ,r r ∆ )
•  The interregional transport capacity of the network is assumed to be constant and 
non-binding in Germany as shown in Table 2. 
•  The regional price p
0
r (=91.73 €/MWh) and the regional demand d
0
r (total demand is 
270.28 TWh, for regional demand see Table 3) of electricity have to be found for the 
present situation in order to be able to calibrate the model for the reference case. This 
case is referred to as “REF”. 
•  Variable operating costs per technology c
v
i (this is 2.5, 10, 15, 20, 27.5 €/MWh for 
respectively HYD, NUC, HC/BC, GAS and OIL) have to be assessed, which serves 
as a lower bound for the marginal production cost c
m
f (equation (11)).  
•  Finally, the production limit per technology q
max
i,f has to be defined, which serves as 
an upper bound of production qi,f (equation (12)). 
 
6. Results  
In Section 5, the model has been calibrated to the reference case (REF), while Section 4 
gave a formal description of the two cases that can be calculated with the model, namely 
the case with strategic behaviour (STRA) and the fully competitive case (COMP).  
Let us first consider the STRA case in more detail. This case is also known as an oli-
gopolistic game and it is characterised by an overall HHI index of 0.0771, as calculated 
by Equation (20). Table 4 displays for the STRA case, the regional competitiveness as 
expressed by HHIr, consumer prices pr, exports, imports, the resulting trade balance and 
regional demand. 
Table 4 shows that regional HHIr indicators differ. The highest concentration emerges in 
the region around Berlin (3), where we also find the highest regional price of electricity.      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  13 
The weighted average electricity price has dropped by 32%, while total demand has gone 
up by 17% as compared to REF. 
Let us now consider the COMP case in more detail. This case is characterised by an 
overall HHI index of 0.1021. Table 5 displays for the COMP case, regional competitive-
ness as expressed by HHIr, consumer prices pr, exports, imports, the resulting trade bal-
ance and regional demand. 
Table 5 shows that regional HHIr indicators increase substantially, but now beyond their 
critical values. For instance, a monopoly emerges in the metropolitan region Hamburg 
(4). The highest regional prices of electricity are found in southern Germany (1 and 2), 
which also have the lowest HHIr value. The weighted average electricity price has 
dropped by 63%, while total demand has gone up by 49% as compared to REF. 
Given the exogenous information about variable technology and transport costs of Ger-
man electricity producers, an oligopolistic market game shows that the non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium is a feasible solution. The overall HHI index does not exceed its criti-
cal value. Comparing STRA to COMP, it turns out that COMP leads to an unfeasible so-
lution for the present structure of power supply firms in the German electricity market. 
As previous natural monopolies, characterised by high but decreasing average costs 
above marginal costs, cannot survive in this contestable market with fierce replacement 
competition.  
If we take the recent mergers into account, we get a different picture. Table 6 shows the 
result in the case where firms merge into a single utility per region, which is realised by 
adding up the production capacities per technology per region. This equal to the result 
for the most recent mergers between regions in the current model set-up.
4 Table 6 clearly 
shows the incentive of firms to merge in a liberalised electricity market, as they can now 
charge substantially higher electricity prices. This case is characterised by an overall 
HHI index of 0.1381, while the variation in regional concentration went down. The 
weighted average electricity price is now only 15% lower, while total demand increased 
by 7% as compared to REF. 
It is also possible to compare REF, STRA and COMP in a different way. Therefore, we 
calculated the payoff (calculated as the income from power supply minus transport cost 
minus the cost of produced electricity times the variable costs) for each firm in the three 
cases. Table 7 shows besides the payoff also the endogenously derived marginal cost 
(c
m
f). The larger the difference between the marginal cost and the variable costs (c
v
i), the 
higher the payoff. It follows from Table 7 that the payoff is the largest in REF, in-
between in STRA and the lowest in COMP. In COMP, however, we find negative pay-
offs for 8 small firms. A rational agent would rather not supply in such a situation. This 
shows that COMP is not a realistic outcome, as we already noticed by the too high HHIr 
values.  
                                                   
4   Admundsen and Bergman (2002) present a different method for dealing with firm mergers. 
This is omitted here as it substantially changes the model set-up, without changing the point 
we want to make here.      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  14 
6.1 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis, by varying transport fees and tariffs, demonstrates significant 
changes in electricity prices, trade and profitability. Crucially, electricity prices are in-
fluenced by transport tariffs: higher transport fees and unified tariffs lead to higher elec-
tricity prices and a larger regional deviation. Because of that, market shares in the 
“home” region increases when the transport prices rise. Price-reliant regional demand 
degenerates, due to growing electricity prices, which induces lower supply, production 
and export, respectively. Regional net export suffers more by higher transport prices. 
Trade of electricity includes implicitly also electricity generated by renewable energy, 
also known as “green electricity”. Model results demonstrate that a modification of net 
capacities reveal no significant changes in trade adjustments, because all net capacities 
are found to be operated in every region entirely. 
Due to prices, production capacities and market reactions of other players, technologies 
utilised for electricity production differ significantly in both cases (see Figure 2). 
In the case of full competition in the German electricity market, cheap technologies, like 
old hard and brown coal power plants, are used. Figure 2 compares the shares of tech-
nologies to electricity production in Germany in the two different cases. In comparison 
to the reference case, full competition (COMP) leads to the use of more pollution-
intensive but cheaper technologies, like hard and brown coal, whereas strategic behav-
iour (STRA) leads to an input with more environmental friendly technologies, like gas, 
and hydro (see Figure 2).  
Experiences in other electricity markets in the USA and UK demonstrate, on the con-
trary, that new additional installed capacity is primarily coming from gas. The main rea-
son for our findings is that we have a static model, which neglects dynamic adjustment 
processes of future investment decisions. The main purpose of our analysis is to demon-
strate, in the current technology mix, the potential implications on utilised technologies 
of a stronger competition process. The overall amount of domestic electricity production 
declines in comparison to the reference scenario (electricity production in 1998), which 
is compensated by an increase of electricity imports.  
In continuing the sensitivity analysis, four more cases are compared, namely an increase 
of renewable energy fostered by the German renewable energy law (EUSTRA, 
EUCOMP) and a full nuclear phase out (NUCSTRA, NUCCOMP). We detect a much 
higher increase of the gas technology and renewable energy. But, when the nuclear en-
ergy has to be substituted by other technologies, environmental unfriendly technologies, 
like hard and brown coal have to be used in bigger proportions as well to meet electricity 
demand. If we compare the case of nuclear phase out with full competition 
(NUCCOMP) and strategic behaviour (NUCSTRA), we detect, as before, that there is 
more pollution in NUCCOMP than in NUCSTRA. In the case where the EU promotes 
renewable energy, by the renewable energy law, strategic behaviour (EUSTRA) also 
leads to a higher use of renewable energies, than in the competitive case (EUCOMP).  
In total, by considering strategic behaviour, an induced rise of production and consumer 
prices, initiates a preservation of relatively small electricity suppliers. These cannot stay 
independently, due to the need of mergers with large energy suppliers, in a fully com-
petitive market. Energy suppliers with a low market share use mainly environmental      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  15 
friendly technologies of which a large part is more expensive than other pollution inten-
sive technologies. Considering full competition, large energy suppliers can enlarge their 
market shares significantly, whereas small suppliers are loosing market shares or have to 
suffer losses. The environmental situation can be improved by creating a situation, where 
energy suppliers act strategically. This offers firms the opportunity to expand their rela-
tively more expensive, but environmental friendly, technologies. 
 
7. Conclusions and Outlook 
This paper has shown that, while enhancing competition in the electricity market, strate-
gic behaviour (e.g. a change in action of one firm affects the electricity price and, hence, 
the payoffs of other firms) may determine the structure of the market and the energy 
supply network. A run with the model, where firms are fully competitive and do not act 
strategically, shows that gains and market shares increase, while production and con-
sumer prices decrease significantly. Furthermore, more production and lower consumer 
prices also leads to a need for relatively small electricity suppliers to merge with rela-
tively large suppliers, as they can no longer stay independent. This process has started in 
the year 2000. However, the environmental situation improves, due to lower carbon 
emissions, in the case where firms do act strategically, which is also known as an imper-
fect market. Here energy suppliers with economically inefficient but environmental ef-
fective technologies are able to stay in the market. Moreover, when firms act strategi-
cally, the environment is better off at the cost of higher electricity prices 
Nowadays, the German electricity market is characterised by a huge dynamic system re-
sulting in fusions of firms, varying prices and an establishment of new products and a 
new structure of production technologies. Comparing a fully competitive market situa-
tion with an oligopolistic market, where energy suppliers act strategically, reveals that 
competition does not only lead to declining prices, but also to higher carbon emissions. It 
is likely that the privatisation process leads to a strong oligopolistic market, where large 
energy suppliers with substantial market shares can influence electricity prices. In fact, 
this development triggers increasing market prices, but additionally avoids the applica-
tion of economically efficient but environmentally inefficient technologies. The intention 
of the liberalisation of the German electricity market per se was to guarantee efficient 
production by abolishing regional energy monopolies, to improve energy services and to 
reduce electricity prices. From an environmental perspective, the market cannot sort out 
all this by itself; additional laws and directives are necessary to assure environmental 
friendly electricity production. This paper has shown that an imperfect market situation 
is a better breeding ground for environmental effective technologies. 
Furthermore, we did not include European trade flows into our model, due to data limita-
tions. This is an area for further research. Our future work focuses on simulating a model 
of the European-wide electricity market liberalisation. At this stage we can only hint at 
the possible impact of such an extension. It is likely that due to the German policy to 
phase out of nuclear power and European policy to increase renewable energy, more and 
cheaper electricity from Poland and France will be imported.       Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  16 
In the near future, European neighbouring countries may also influence the German elec-
tricity market, not only by lower environmental standards and lower production costs, 
but also by larger construction efficiency, leading to higher electricity imports and a re-
duction of environmental friendly electricity production. A harmonisation of the liberali-
sation degree of the European countries will foster competition and also strategic behav-
iour of all competing firms, which will induce more price competition. Moreover, the 
development of environmental friendly electricity production will crucially depend on a 
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Tables 
Table 1 The considered 30 energy suppliers in Germany, their main production technol-
ogy and total production capacity. 





1. South-  Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW)  Nuclear 4,776 
    West  Neckarwerke Stuttgart AG (NWS)  Nuclear  2,920 
  Großkraftwerk MANNHEIM AG   Hard Coal  1,497 
 Kraftwerk  LAUFENBURG  Hydro  151 
  Elektrizitäts- und Wasserwerk Rhein-Neckar AG (EWRN)  Hard Coal  376 
2. South-  BAYERNWERK AG   Nuclear 4,787 
    East  LECH Elektrizitätswerke AG   Hydro  241 
  Fränkisches Überlandwerk AG (FUW)  Gas  1 
  EWAG Energie- und Wasserversorgung AG   Hard Coal  101 
 Stadtwerke  AUGSBURG  Gas  21 
3. Berlin  Berliner Kraft- und Licht AG (BEWAG)  Hard Coal  2,493 
4.Hamburg Hamburgische Electricitäts-Werke AG (HEW)  Nuclear 3,272 
5. Middle-  PREUSSENELEKTRA AG   Nuclear 9,884 
    North  SCHLESWAG AG  Hydro  14 
 HASTRA  AG  Gas  20 
 EWE  AG  Gas  14 
  Braunschweigische Kohlen-Bergwerke AG (BKB)  Brown Coal  525 
  Überlandwerk Nord-Hannover (UNH)  Gas  3 
6. West  RWE Energie AG  Brown Coal  17,134 
  STEAG Geschäftsbereich Energiewirtschaft Hard  Coal  1,122 
  Wuppertaler Stadtwerke AG (WSW)  Gas  160 
  Gas-, Elektrizitäts- und Wasserwerke Köln AG (GEW)  Brown Coal  425 
  ELEKTROMARK Kommunales Elektrizitätswerk Mark AG  Hard Coal  977 
  Stadtwerke Düsseldorf AG (SWD)  Hard Coal  848 
7. East  VEAG Vereinigte Energiewerke AG  Brown Coal  9,247 
8. North-  VEW Energie AG  Gas 4,002 
    West  VEBA Kraftwerke AG  Hard Coal  3,469 
  Elektrizitätswerk Minden-Ravensberg GmbH (EMR)  Gas  664 
 PESAG  Gas  0.2 
  Dortmunder Energie- und Wasserversorgung GmbH (DEW)  Gas  12 
Total:     69,158 
Note: AG =  aktiengesellshaft. Main utilities are in bold face, they took over the other utilities 
within their region in 2000.  
Source: Verbändevereinbarung (2001). 
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Table 2 Parameters of EMELIE for Germany. 
Description  Value and unit 
Price elasticity of demand, σr = σ  0.4 
Uniform tariff of 100 km distance (c
100) 5.50  €/MWh 
Tariff per km (above 100 km) (c
1km) 0.10  €/MWh/km 
Cost of net utilisation (c
net)  10      €/MWh 
Capacity constraint on interregional electricity transport, ηr,r*= η   100      TWh/year 
Source: Verbändevereinbarung (2001). 
 
Table 3 The average distances between the regions and regional electricity demand in 
Germany. 
  Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 7 Region 8 
Demand 
(TWh/year) 
Region  1 0 164 508 536 400 265 429 372 37.26 
Region  2  164  0 436 543 422 379 365 443 43.47 
Region  3  508 436  0 257 250 486  79 400 11.34 
Region  4  536 543 275  0 136 379 272 243  8.91 
Region  5  400 422 250 136  0 265 222 150 55.94 
Region  6  265 379 486 379 265  0 429 143 49.50 
Region  7  429 365  79 272 222 429  0 365 34.02 
Region  8  372 443 400 243 150 143 365  0 29.84 
Source: Verbändevereinbarung (2001). 
 
Table 4 Regional model results where firms behave strategically (STRA).  










Region  1  0.151  63.18 33.97 17.21 16.76 43.25 
Region  2  0.144  67.98 10.97 34.95  -23.99 49.01 
Region  3  0.157  74.67  12.61 9.73 2.88  12.31 
Region  4  0.132  66.51  16.30 8.24 8.06  10.13 
Region  5  0.136  60.05 28.92 49.05  -20.13 66.27 
Region  6  0.115  56.31 38.99 27.11 11.88 60.17 
Region  7  0.145  69.79 14.99 29.41  -14.42 37.95 
Region  8  0.133  57.41 41.88 22.93 18.95 35.99 
Total  0.0771  62.65 198.63 198.63  0  315.09 
Source: Model calculations.      Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity market  20 
Table 5 Regional model results in competitive equilibrium (COMP).  










Region 1  0.324  36.60  21.93  0  21.93  53.81 
Region 2  0.387  43.00  0  21.93  -21.93  58.86 
Region  3  0.968  30.50 13.01 17.33 -4.32 17.62 
Region  4  1.000  31.90 3.14 0  3.14  13.59 
Region 5  0.817  35.50  0  3.42  -3.42  81.78 
Region  6  0.546  30.50  0 0 0  76.89 
Region  7  0.629  30.50 17.33 13.02  4.31 52.85 
Region  8  0.446  30.50 0.29 0  0.29  46.35 
Total  0.1021  34.21 55.70 55.70  0  401.75 
Source: Model calculations. 
 
Table 6 Regional model results with firm mergers to 8 utilities, where firms behave 
strategically (STRA).  










Region  1  0.186  84.32 27.83 28.70 -0.87 38.54 
Region  2  0.175  85.89 20.90 33.43  -12.53 44.63 
Region  3  0.160  80.51  13.68 9.72 3.96  11.95 
Region  4  0.166  78.90 18.64  7.68 10.96  9.46 
Region  5  0.159  69.42 34.96 48.51  -13.55 62.54 
Region  6  0.179  77.85 34.21 39.41 -5.19 52.86 
Region  7  0.152  75.55 30.88 28.00  2.88 36.77 
Region  8  0.177  74.35 39.20 24.85 14.34 32.46 
Total  0.1381  77.59 220.29 220.29  0  289.19 
Source: Model calculations. 
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Table 7 Firm’s payoff and marginal production cost for three cases.  
 Payoff  Marginal  cost 
Firm REF  STRA  COMP  STRA  COMP 
EnBW 2303.12  728.77  319.77  15.00  21.10 
NWS 0.00  597.71  177.20  18.29  21.10 
MANNHEIM 0.00  375.72  48.14  24.26  21.10 
LAUFENBURG  38.22 52.83 19.33 44.57  21.10 
EWRN  0.00 99.22 16.56 41.17  21.10 
BAYERNWERK 2446.80  751.11  470.38  14.48  27.50 
LECH  109.42 82.99 31.84 45.38  27.50 
FUW 0.35  0.20  0.04  52.45  27.50 
EWAG  52.20 31.80 10.36 49.50  27.50 
AUGSBURG 10.09  5.80  1.28  51.85  27.50 
BEWAG 689.09  475.45  -6.17  20.00  15.00 
HEW 525.19  512.14  91.37  20.00  16.40 
PREUSSENELEKTRA 3491.89 1194.34  574.36  11.70  20.00 
SCHLESWAG 0.73  5.23  1.90  45.41  20.00 
HASTRA 9.49  4.57  -0.04  44.61  20.00 
EWE 0.00  2.83  -0.01  45.39  20.00 
BKB 0.00  129.12  20.22  38.39  20.00 
UNH 1.38  0.66  0.00  47.01  20.00 
RWE 2796.52  983.25  239.23  10.00  15.00 
STEAG 0.00  220.26  -4.32  27.46  15.00 
WSW 0.00  30.82  -0.21  37.63  15.00 
GEW 0.00  88.83  -1.53  34.30  15.00 
ELEKTROMARK 248.53  195.29 12.74 28.48  15.00 
SWD 204.94  147.49  -1.47  29.62  15.00 
VEAG 2243.82  844.31  174.98  15.00  15.00 
VEW 493.43  563.05  29.73  20.00  15.00 
VEBA 1319.83  552.06  -11.36  20.03  15.00 
EMR 0.00  133.38  7.95  34.03  15.00 
PESAG 0.00  0.04  0.00  41.91  20.00 
DEW 0.00  2.53  0.33  41.50  15.00 
total 16985.04  8811.80  2222.60     
Note: Payoff = Σr (pr – c
t
l(f),r) sf,r –  Σi qi,f c
v
i and the marginal cost is derived endogenously with 
model calculations. 
Source: Model calculations. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: A map of the considered 8 regions in Germany. 
 
 
 Region 1: South-West  
 Region 2: South-East 
 Region 3: Berlin 
 Region 4: Hamburg 
 Region 5: Middle-North 
 Region 6: West 
 Region 7: East 
 Region 8: North-West 
Source: Verbändevereinbarung (2001) 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NUCCOMP  EUSTRA  EUCOMP 
Source: Model calculations. 
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